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        Rural China provides a useful case for investigating how traditional lineage networks affect 
people’s political and economic opportunities in the new industrial economy.  Since the 1950s, 
China’s restrictive migration policy has frozen the size of lineages; and the Commune system has 
arbitrarily grouped multiple lineages into one administrative village.  Household income was 
highly equalized within villages until 1979, when China began reforms and lineage networks 
started  to  shape  different  outcomes  between  members  of  different  lineages  within  villages.  
Using the China Household Income Project Survey (2002) data and a village fixed-effects model, 
I find that, relative to the same-village fellows who are from smaller lineages, the husbands and 
wives of the largest local lineage are more likely to become the village administrators, and young 
men of the largest local lineage are more likely to have local non-agricultural jobs and higher 
wages.  The paper also finds that the economic advantages of belonging to the largest local 
lineage diminishes as people age and eventually can be offset by the returns to education. 
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1.  Introduction 
         
        Economic transition in China since 1978 has shifted more than 130 million farmers to non-
agricultural jobs.  The share of non-agricultural workers in the rural labor force increased from 
7.1 percent in 1978 to 31.6 percent in 2000.  And the growth of non-agricultural income accounts 
for 45 percent of the growth of total income of rural population.
2  As rural China makes stride 
towards a modern economy, local rituals are still structured by traditional lineage organizations, 
which are built upon ancestral worship and blood ties.  Over generations, lineage identity has 
embodied a strong trust and solidarity with kin, which naturally excludes individuals who are not 
kin (Peng, 2004).  When economic development encounters a traditional institution, what is the 
role  of  the  traditional  institution  in  distributing  the  increasing  economic  opportunities?  
Specifically, this paper investigates the impact of people’s lineage backgrounds on their non-
agricultural  job  opportunities,  job  locations  and  wages.    Munshi  and  Rosenzweig  (2006) 
investigate the role of caste networks in India’s transitional economy.  They find that the caste 
networks  keep  boys  from  moving  out  of  traditional  low-skill  occupations,  though  girls  who 
traditionally are not tied to the networks are more likely to explore the opportunities of the new 
economy.  Unlike Indian castes, which are built on social class, lineages in China are built on 
blood  relations.    No  lineage  has  an  inherent  superiority  or  inferiority,  and,  in  fact,  lineages 
compete against each other for local political prestige and economic resources (Baker, 1979).  
Hence, one would expect the findings in China to be different from those in India: China’s 
lineage  networks  would  probably  support  their  members  to  grasp  political  and  economic 
opportunities, rather than put fetters on them.  Since men traditionally have higher status than 
women  in  patrilineal  lineages,  male  members  are  expected  to  receive  stronger  support  from 
                                                            
2 The data are released by the China Statistic Bureau.  2 
 
lineage networks than female members.  In addition, village administrators in China have a 
strong influence over the allocation and management of local economic resources
3 (Hu 2005).  
This paper, therefore, also investigates the impact of people’s lineages on their political status, 
and examines the association between political status and labor market outcomes. 
        This  paper  is  embedded  in  two  fields  of  literature.    One  is  on  kinship  networks  in 
developing countries.  In those countries, markets don’t function well because transaction costs 
such as search costs and enforcement costs can be too high.  Kinship networks, instead, become 
an important non-market institution to facilitate the exchange of goods and services.  The large 
body  of  literature  on  kinship  networks  pays  most  attention  to  inter-household  risk-sharing.  
Evidence that related households pool income to cope with risks and smooth consumption is 
found in many traditional agricultural economies, such as India (Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989), 
Thailand (Townsend, 1995), Nigeria (Udry 1995), Mexico (Angelucci 2009) and The Phillipines 
(Fafchamps and Lund, 1997).  However, what is the role of kinship networks as the agricultural 
population experiences economic transitions?  The literature addressing this question tends to 
study migrants.  Kinship networks are found to assist migrants to make the move (Dolfin and 
Genicot,  2006),  look  for  jobs  (Munshi,  2003)  and  establish  their  own  business  (Toussaint-
Comeau,  2008)  in  the  destinations.    Yet,  these  findings  do  not  explain  the  role  of  kinship 
networks as the local economy transitions from an agricultural to a modern economy.  China 
provides a useful setting to study the question, as many villages with hundreds of years of history 
are experiencing a rapid economic development.     
      The  second  field  of  related  literature  is  on  social  networks  and  labor-market  search  and 
matching.  Montgomery (1991) develops a formal model explaining the importance of employee 
                                                            
3 The  resources  range  from  land  distribution,  issuing  business  licenses,  and  collecting  taxes  to  managing  the 
construction of public projects and managing village enterprises. 3 
 
referrals in the hiring process.  Empirical research on social networks and job search often use 
the population of the same ethnicity (Barr and Oduro, 2002), origin (Yamauchi and Tanabe, 
2008), or census block (Topa, Ross and Bayer, 2008) to approximate social networks.  However, 
these  may  not  be  good  proxies  since  people  of  the  same  ethnicity,  origin  or  block  do  not 
necessarily contact each other.   Fafchamps and Lund (1997) find that mutual help does not take 
place at the village level but through friends and relatives.  People who are related by blood or 
marriage are a natural resource for networking.  O’Regan and Quigley (1993) and Furtado and 
Theodoropoulos (2010) find that working parents and spouses facilitate one’s access to jobs.  
Zhang and Li (2003) find that family members’ help can increase a rural laborer’s probability of 
obtaining a nonfarm job.  These studies focus on the nuclear family’s members.  Yet, they do not 
take  into  account  that  every  household  is  embedded  within  an  extended  family  network.  
Understanding  the  role  of  extended  family  networks  is  important  to  understand  how  labor 
markets function in developing countries.  The paucity of the research on the role of the extended 
family in people’s labor market outcomes probably is due to the fact that it is hard to identify the 
family ties between households in common datasets.  The unique Chinese culture of patrilineal 
lineage allows me to easily identify extended families.   
        In rural China, the hundreds-of-years-old tradition is that extended families related in men’s 
line live in one settlement and form a lineage.  The size of a lineage ranges from a few to a few 
hundred  households.    All  men  in  one  lineage  are  descendants  of  a  common  ancestor,  and, 
consequently  bear  the  same  surname.    The  surname  composition  of  a  village  represents  the 
composition of the village’s lineages.
4  Data from the 2002 China Household Income Project 
Survey  (CHIPS)  provide  the  information  on  whether  an  individual  bears  the  most  common 
surname in his village.  Given this valuable information, this paper asks the empirical question: 
                                                            
4 Yet, it is possible that a single lineage can be divided into different lineage branches (Cohen, 1990). 4 
 
Do members of the largest local lineage have better economic or political outcomes than their 
same-village fellows who are from smaller local lineages?  A lineage in China is more than a 
cluster  of  extended  families.    Dating  back  to  imperial  China,  lineages  acted  as  local  self-
governance units with internal ritual codes and economic and political structures to hold lineage 
members together.  Though the structures and the autonomy of traditional lineage organizations 
ceased to exist after the Communist Party took rule, lineage identity still plays an important role 
in the inter-personal contacts of today’s rural population.  As a result, a large lineage naturally 
presents more networking resources to its members than a small lineage does.     
        China presents an excellent case in which to study the impact of the size of a lineage on its 
members’ outcomes because a series of China’s policies have produced a quasi-experiment in 
the sizes of lineages.  First, in 1958, China enacted the household registration system, which 
inhibits free migrations and essentially ties rural people to the land where they were born.  Thus, 
the lineage composition in rural villages has remained static since 1958.
5  Given that the oldest 
people studied by this paper were teenagers in 1958—and many others in this study had not been 
born yet—the composition of lineages in the villages in my sample is a pre-determined condition 
rather than a result of personal choices.  Second, shortly after communist China was founded in 
1949,  the  central  government  set  up  administrative  villages  as  the  lowest  level  of  formal 
government  in  order  to  strengthen  the  ruling  party’s  control  and  to  build  up  the  Commune 
system.  An administrative village arbitrarily included one or more lineages
6 because the size 
was determined by the needs of collective farming rather than by the ritual connection among 
                                                            
5 The household registration system has been partially relaxed since the 1980s.  The surplus rural laborers pour to 
cities seeking non-agricultural jobs.  However, rural workers do not have the same access as urban citizens to 
medication, pension, housing and children’s schooling in cities, which makes permanent rural-to-urban migrations 
still extremely difficult.  Most rural workers have to commute between cities and their original villages several times 
a year.   
6 A very large lineage can be broken into several single lineage brigades. 5 
 
people.  People in one administrative village, regardless of their lineages, all have been exposed 
to the same political and economic system.  Economic equality within villages was extremely 
high during the 1960s and 1970s, as the Commune system was consolidated at that time.  Yet, 
inter-village economic inequality could still be large because the villages with better land or 
access to water produced more for the members to divide up (Blecher, 2003, pp.140).  The 
within-village equality gradually disappeared in the 1980s, as China started its the economic 
reform and abandoned the Commune system.  Therefore, I use an administrative-village fixed-
effects model to compare people’s outcomes in 2002 across lineages but within villages.  The 
village fixed-effects control for the pre-determined economic status about 25 years ago, as well 
as for the village political system and geographic conditions.   
        To further present evidence that the advantage of belonging to a large lineage arises from 
networking resources, I investigate whether the impact of belonging to the largest local lineage 
varies by gender and by age.  If the impact is stronger for members who are more tied to the 
networks (e.g., men vs. women) or who need the networks more (e.g., young vs. old), this can 
rule  out  an  alternative  explanation  that  people  from  the  largest  local  lineage  perform  better 
because they have, on average, better unobservable abilities, such as intelligence and health, than 
members from smaller local lineages.   
       The major findings of the paper include the following: (1) Husbands and wives of the largest 
local lineage are more likely than their same village fellows who are from smaller local lineages 
to obtain local political administrator positions.  (2) Young men of the largest local lineage are 
more likely to have non-agricultural jobs and tend to have higher wages than their same-village 
fellows who are from smaller local lineages.  However, old men’s lineage backgrounds do not 
affect their job opportunities and wages.  In the long run, educational background matters more 6 
 
than lineage.  (3) Workers from the largest local lineage are more likely than their counterparts to 
work in their own towns instead of migrating to cities to work.  This suggests that the economic 
advantages of the largest local lineage may arise from their local political power.   
        The remainder of this paper is composed of five sections: Section 2 provides a theoretical 
framework, which suggests that reciprocity can perform better in large lineage networks than in 
small lineage networks.  Section 3 discussed the history of lineage and village governance in 
rural China.  Section 4 introduces the data.  Sections 5 and 6, respectively, present the empirical 
models and the results.  Section 7 concludes.  
 
2.  Theoretical Framework 
       
        In the absence of formal institutions, inter-household exchange plays a key role in rural 
China.  This system is maintained and enforced through trading favors and reciprocity, which 
essentially means: I help you today because I expect you to help me tomorrow (Posner, 1980).  
The help can take many forms: providing money, services or information.
7  The idea of self-
enforcing reciprocity was formalized with repeated game theory models, in which a defection is 
deterred by threatening exclusion from future exchange (Kimball, 1988; Coate and Ravallion, 
1993).  Kinship clans built on blood ties provide a perfect environment for enforcing an informal 
arrangement because the informal arrangement is embedded in a long-term and multifaceted 
relationship (Kranton, 1996, Cox and Fafchamps, 2008).  First, the households in a kinship clan 
have  been  clustered  together  for  generations,  and  this  long-lasting  connection  increases  an 
                                                            
7 For example, I lend you money today to pay your family member’s medical bill because I expect you to lend me 
money in the future if I lose my job (Fafchamps and Lund, 2003); an incumbent village leader would like to support 
his fellow kin’s business because he expects his kin to vote for him to beat the challengers (Peng, 2004); an 
employer would like to share information about the trustworthiness of job candidates with another employer because 
the first employer expects that his fellow would do the same for him in the future (Gerxhani, Brandts, and Schram, 
2011).   7 
 
individual’s belief that his offspring may need others’ help in the future, which, in turn, gives 
him more incentive to help others if asked right now (Coate and Ravallion, 1993).  Second, in 
kinship clans, a defector not only loses future exchange within the arrangement, but can also be 
denied other benefits associated with the clan, such as socialization, participation in ritual events, 
and access to potential mates (Basu, 1986).   
        A large lineage is likely to implement an informal arrangement better than a small lineage 
for  two  reasons.    First,  the  cost  of  defection  potentially  rises  as  the  lineage  size  increases.  
Consider that network links carry both transfers and information.  Consequently, a deviant may 
be denied future exchange not only with the victim but also with the victim’s friends.  In a 
complete network, where everyone knows everyone else, the punishment could be as severe as 
leaving  the  deviant  in  autarky.    Bloch,  Genicot  and  Ray  (2006)  define  this  case  as  strong 
punishment, and they prove that under strong punishment, the complete networks are stable.  
Lineage organizations in China are, indeed, complete networks, as the genealogical books make 
it  easy  for  everyone  to  know  their  kin.  Therefore,  under  the  threat  of  strong  punishment,  a 
member of a large lineage is less likely than a member of a small lineage to renege, because the 
former would lose more links than the latter should a defection happen.  The second reason 
arises from statistical economies of a large cluster of population.  As the lineage size increases, 
the fluctuation of income
8 and labor market outcomes among individuals can be less correlated.  
Calvo-Armengol and Jackson (2004) show that, when a complete network has more agents, the 
correlation between two agents’ employment decreases.
9  As two agents face a less covariate 
stream of status, each agent is more willing to offer help if he has better status than the other 
because he knows that there might be a good chance that they will receive reverse draws in the 
                                                            
8 I use data from the CHIPS and find that the variation of household income increases as the lineage size increases. 
9 This is due to the decreased importance of any single link if an agent has many links.   8 
 
future (Coate and Ravallion, 2003).  Due to the above two reasons, large lineages are expected to 
be more stable than small lineages and to provide better support to the members who need help.
10   
         
3.  History of Lineage and Village Governance in Rural China 
 
        The history of lineage organizations has occurred in three stages.  The first stage lasted 
about nine hundred years.  The lineage organization started to take shape in 1000 AD.  After 
hundreds of years of development, it prevailed in China from 1700AD (Qing dynasty) untill 
1949.    The  second  stage  was  Mao’s  era  (1949-1976).    Mao’s  communist  government  put 
tremendous effort into dismantling the lineage organizations and replacing them with the Party 
government.  The third stage is the post-Mao era.  The lineage organizations have revived since 
China began its the economic and political reforms.   
        In imperial times, a lineage was a local ritual, economic and political organization.  Large 
lineages  were  marked  by:  ancestral  halls,  the  shrines  where  the  common  ancestors  were 
consecrated; genealogies, the books where lineage histories and family trees were recorded; and 
trust land, which member households jointly owned and farmed
11 (Ruf, 1998).  The revenue 
from the trust land was used on public goods such as schools, roads, irrigation facilities, and 
charities.  Each lineage was under the leadership of a council of senior male elites, who were rich 
and well-educated.  The council enforced the lineage rules, which were codes of conduct written 
                                                            
10 Some scholars on social networks find that community size is negatively correlated with prosocial behaviors.  
This can be because, as the community size increases, an individual has to spend less time socializing with each 
friend (Putnam, 1995), or social networks are less interconnected (Allcott, Karlan, Mobius and Rosenblat, 2007).  
However, the communities these papers refer to are cities or schools.  On the contrary, China’s lineages are built 
upon blood ties, which won’t be dissipated with loose contacts.  In addition, the physical proximity between member 
households  and  the  rituals,  such  as  annual  ancestor  worship  and  compiling  genealogies,  in  China’s  lineage 
organizations has lasted over generations.  All these traditions not only make a lineage a complete network but also 
reduce the cost of maintaining connections with each other.  Therefore, an increase in the lineage size may not 
necessarily weaken the ties between clan members.     
11 The trust land usually account for less than 40% of the total cultivated land of a lineage.  The rest is the private 
land owned by each household (Baker, 1979). 9 
 
in the genealogy books.
12 (Baker, 1979)  Lineages in imperial China actually functioned in a 
similar manner as churches in western culture, except that Chinese worshipped their ancestors.   
        Internally,  lineages  in  imperial  China  were  self-governance  organizations.    Externally, 
neighboring  lineages  were  rivals  competing  for  resources  and  prestige  (Baker,  1979).    All 
lineages had distinct territories in which outsiders are not allowed to own land.  In south China, 
where lineage organizations were traditionally more prevalent than the north, large lineages even 
built high walls surrounding their territories to guard against potential attacks from other lineages.  
It is evident that lineages in imperial China set boundaries to people’s social life. 
        After communist China was founded in 1949, one of the major goals of Mao’s government 
was to establish an effective village administration to replace local lineage organizations.  It took 
the Party only four years to organize the Commune system, within which the brigade was the 
lowest level of local administration.  A brigade consisted of 300-500 households, or 1,000-2,000 
people,  which  usually  included  multiple  neighboring  lineages.
13   The  size  of  a  brigade  was 
determined by the need for collective production.  Each brigade was under the leadership of a 
Party  branch  committee.    The  committee  members  were  from  poor  families  and  did  not 
necessarily have a good education, which was in contrast to lineage leaders in the past.  In order 
to weaken agnatic solidarity between rich and poor kin and to diffuse lineage identity, the Party 
launched the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) to inject the ideology of class consciousness and 
class struggle.  The government label agnatic loyalty as “feudal poison.”  Ancestral halls were 
torn down, and genealogical books were burned.  Lineage identity seemed to be reduced to a 
lingering mentality (Peng, 2004). 
                                                            
12 Those rules essentially reflected the ideology of Confucianism and set up the rights and duties between man and 
woman, man and man, and man and the state (Freedman, 1958).  
13 A very large lineage can be broken into several single-lineage brigades. 10 
 
        The dormant culture of lineage started to revive shortly after the economic and political 
reform took place in 1978.  The Commune system was officially abolished and replaced by the 
household responsibility contract system, in which farm lands were allocated to households, and 
households  were  free  to  sell  their  products  after  fulfilling  the  contract  with  government.  
Brigades were renamed “administrative villages.”  The native adult residents of each village now 
elect a village council, which shares political power with the Party branch committee.
14  Both the 
household-based farming and the election systems have made mutual help and support between 
households desirable.  Ancestral halls have been rebuilt and genealogical books reprinted.  The 
long time tradition of lineage networks, therefore, has regained its importance in shaping the 
economic and political status of the people. 
 
4.  Data 
 
        The data I use are from the rural section of the CHIPS 2002.
15  The survey interviewed 9200 
randomly-selected rural households from 961 villages in 22 provinces.  Every individual in the 
surveyed households answered questions about his/her personal information.  The household-
level  questions  were  answered  by  household  heads,  and  the  village-level  questions  were 
answered by village heads. 
        There are three questions related to surnames.  The first one is a household-level question, 
and the other two are village-level questions.  Q1. “Does your family belong to the largest 
surname lineage in the village?”  Q2. “Is the percentage of the largest surname households to 
total number of households more than 50%?”  Q3. “Is the percentage of the top five largest 
                                                            
14 There is no official rule for how the power is distributed between the village committee and the Party branch (Oi 
and Rozelle, 2000).   
15 The survey has two earlier waves: 1988 and 1985.  But the earlier waves don’t have questions about villagers’ 
surnames and lineages. 11 
 
surnames to total number of households more than 50%?”  There is no precise information in the 
survey  about  how  large  the  largest  local  lineage  is  compared  to  other  local  lineages.  
Nevertheless, using the answers to Q2 and Q3, one can define three types of villages to reflect 
three levels of dominance of the largest surname in local villages.  Villages that answer “yes” to 
Q2 are type 1 villages.  Villages that answer “no” to Q2 and “yes” to Q3 are type 2 villages.  
Villages who answer “no” to both Q2 and Q3 are type 3 villages.  The largest local surname is 
the most dominant in type 1 villages, moderately dominant in type 2 villages, and the least 
dominant in type 3 villages.  Figure A1 roughly illustrates the lineage compositions in the three 
types  of  villages.    I  use  the  surveyed  households  to  calculate  the  percentage  of  the  largest 
surname households to all the households in each village.  On average, the types 1, 2 and 3 
villages, respectively, have 71 percent, 37 percent and 15 percent of households bearing the 
largest local surname.  The breakdowns of the surveyed villages into the three types are 30 
percent, 37 percent and 33 percent (287:354:319).     
        In Table A1, I summarize the basic statistics of the three types of villages.  I first compare 
types  1  and  3  because  the  lineage  compositions  of  the  two  types  of  villages  are  distinctly 
different.  Type 1 villages are smaller than type 3 in both population and farm land area.  Type 1 
villages are more likely than type 3 to be located in mountainous areas and less likely to be in 
suburbs of large cities.  Despite that the locations of type 1 villages tend to be isolated, they turn 
out to be richer than type 3 villages.  The 2002 per capita income in type 1 villages was greater 
and had grown faster since 1990 than that in type 3.  Type 1 villages also are more likely than 
type 3 to have village enterprises, which can provide people with local non-agricultural jobs.  
With regard to politics, the village council members are chosen by election in almost all villages.  
In most cases, villagers, and not the upper level administrators, nominate the candidates who run 12 
 
for village councils.  However, the chances that villagers do the nomination are higher in type 3 
villages than type 1.  For the majority of the variables in Table A1, the values of type 2 villages 
are located between types 1 and 3 and are closer to type 1 than to type 3.   
        The observation that type 1 and 2 villages tend to have better economic conditions than type 
3 villages suggests that the members of large lineages may, on average, do better economically 
than the members of small lineages.  This is consistent with the prediction from the theory in 
Section 2.  However, type 1 and 2 villages also differ from type 3 villages in other respects, such 
as  geographic  factors,  which  can  simultaneously  determine  the  lineage  compositions  and 
economic outcomes.  Therefore, one cannot yet assume any causality between lineage size and 
the economic outcomes from Table A1.   
 
5.  The Empirical Models 
         
        I use an administrative-village fixed effects model to estimate the impact of lineage size on 
lineage members’ economic and political status.  
outcome                  1 if   bears the largest surname in village                  (1) 
The subscripts   and   indicate the person   living in the village  . The outcome variables include 
the probability of being a village cadre,
16 the probability of having a non-agricultural job, and 
the natural log of wage.     is the administrative village fixed effects.     is an indicator variable 
which  is  one  if  person   bears  the  largest  surname  in  village  ,  and  zero  otherwise.       
represents a vector of individual characteristics.      is the error term.  The empirical question is 
                                                            
16 Cadre means administrators in China.  In both Russia’s and China’s revolutionary eras, the word refers to a group 
of  leaders  active  in  promoting  the  revolution  of  the  communist  party.    It  no  longer  has  any  revolutionary 
implications in today’s China.  13 
 
whether members of the largest surname lineage in one village tend to have better economic and 
political outcomes than members of other lineages in the same village.  
        Using the administrative village fixed effects model,     is estimated by comparing people 
from different lineages within a village.  This can rule out attributing the effects of geography, 
natural endowment, and political institutions to that of the size of lineage.  Moreover, the village 
fixed-effects model can make up for the shortcomings of using a cross-sectional dataset.  Due to 
the  history  of  the  Commune  system,  households  in  single  village  had  very  equal  economic 
conditions  until  1979.    Hence,  the  village  fixed-effects  also  function  as  controls  of  pre-
determined economic conditions.    
        However, the village fixed-effects model cannot rule out the case that there may be some 
unobservable systematic differences between large and small lineages, such as intelligence and 
health genes, which affect both the size of a lineage and the economic and political outcomes of 
its members.  I address this concern by comparing the effect of belonging to the largest local 
lineage on husbands vs. wives and also on young vs. old people.  Detailed discussions on this are 
in Section 6.   
        To further present the evidence of lineage networking, I use a second model to show the 
association between an individual’s outcome and his kin’s outcomes.  The model is written as 
Equation (2). 
outcome                  ,               ,                         ν    .  (2) 
The outcome variable is the current political or economic status of a person   in the village   in 
the province  .  The outcomes include the probability of currently being a village leader and the 
probability of currently having a non-agricultural job.     ,        represents the past political or 
economic outcomes of the people from the largest local lineage at the village   in the province  .  14 
 
   ,        represents the past political or economic outcomes of the people from other lineages 
at village   in province  .  The person  ’s outcome is excluded from    ,        and    ,       .  
I  can’t  use  village  fixed  effects  for  this  model  because  both    ,        and    ,        are 
village-level  explanatory  variables.    Instead,  I  use  province  fixed-effects  to  control  for 
geographic and political institutional variations.        is a vector of village characteristics and 
      represents a vector of individual characteristics, and ν     is the error term.  The hypothesis 
about the value of    and    depends on the person  ’s lineage background: 
    is from the largest local lineage    is from a smaller local lineage 
    +  0 
    0  + or 0 
If  the  person   is  from  the  largest  local  lineage,    is  hypothesized  to  be  positive  and    is 
hypothesized to be zero.  If the person   is from a smaller local lineage,    is hypothesized to be 
zero and     can be either positive or zero because    ,        is not a precise measure of the 
person  ’s same-lineage fellows.  The model attempts to show that an individual’s outcome is 
associated  with  the  historical  outcomes  of  his  same-lineage  fellows,  but  not  with  those  of 
someone outside of his lineage.   
        Model (2) can also be used to rule out the gene argument.  If members of the largest local 
lineage  outperform  their  counterparts  from  smaller  local  lineages  is  because  large  lineage 
members possess better genes, one would expect the estimation of model (2) to generate the 
following results: 
    is from the largest local lineage    is from a smaller local lineage 
    +  0 
    +  0  15 
 
Both    ,        and    ,        can be considered the supply of local cadre and job positions.   
If the population of the largest local lineage is smarter than the population of smaller local 
lineages, the former is expected to capture all opportunities better than the latter, whether or not 
these positions were previously held by the largest local lineage members or other local lineage 
members.  In this case,    and    could both be positive if a person   is from the largest local 
lineage and zero if the person   is from smaller local lineages.   
 
6.  The Results 
 
6.1  The Evidence of Mutual Help 
        The theory in Section 2 suggests that informal exchanges are better enforced as the size of 
lineage increases.  I, therefore, use equation (1) to test whether mutual help is more likely to 
happen among the largest local lineage members than among those of the smaller lineages in the 
same village.  The survey asks household heads a series of questions on mutual help: Do you 
often receive help from your neighbors and relatives
17 in (a) farming (b) money (c) looking after 
the sick, senior or young (d) wedding or funeral ceremonies.  For each question, I construct a 
binary dependent variable that is one if the answer is “very often” or “often” and zero if the 
answer  is  “a  few  times”  or  “none.”    The  results  are  presented  in  Table  1.    The  first  four 
estimations in Column (1) indicate that belonging to the largest local lineage increases one’s 
likelihood of receiving frequent help in farming and borrowing money by five percentage points, 
and in caring for family members and hosting weddings or funerals by 2.5 percentage points.  
The estimation in Column (1) shows that belonging to the largest local lineage reduces one’s loss 
in case of natural disasters by eight percent.  The contrast of Columns (2) and (3) shows that the 
                                                            
17 I consider “neighbors and relatives” as lineage fellows, because extended families cluster in the lineage territory.  16 
 
impact of belonging to the largest local lineage is strong in type 1 and 2 villages, but diminishes 
to zero in type 3 villages.  This is because the size difference between the largest lineage and 
other lineages is more dramatic in type 1 and 2 than in type 3 villages.  The results in Table 1 
suggest that members of large lineages are more willing to cooperate than members of small 
lineages are. 
   
6.2 Political Outcomes 
        I now examine the impact of belonging to the largest local lineage on people’s political 
status.  Recall from Section 3 that the village administration authority is shared by two groups: 
the village Party branch and the village council.  The chief-secretary of the village Party branch 
is appointed by the county-level Party committee, while the village council chief is elected by 
adult  villagers.    CHIPS  data  indicate  only  whether  a  person  is  a  cadre  member  but  do  not 
distinguish  between  the  two  groups.    Nevertheless,  bearing  the  largest  local  surname  may 
increase one’s likelihood of becoming either a cadre member of either group.  On the one hand, 
the members of the largest local lineage are more likely to be appointed chief-secretary of the 
Party branch because they are believed to have more supporters in the village than members of 
smaller local lineages (Xiao, 2002).  On the other hand, a candidate from the largest local lineage 
who runs for chief of the village council can use the size advantage of his lineage to garner the 
most votes.  In addition, candidates for chief of the village council sometimes are nominated by 
chief-secretary of the village Party branch.  The chief-secretary is likely to try to have someone 
from his own lineage elected (Xiao, 2002).
18  In the CHIPS data, people from the largest local 
                                                            
18 Popular strategies of the chief-secretaries include nominating a single candidate, or nominating a strong candidate 
from their own lineage and weak candidates from other lineages. 17 
 
lineage account for 42 percent of the total population, but 47 percent of all cadre members.
19  
This indicates that large local lineages are over-represented in the village’s administration.        
        I restrict the sample to men and women aged between 26 and 60 and use equation (1) to test 
whether the largest local lineage grant their members any political advantages.  The outcome 
variable is a binary indicator which is one if the person has ever been a village cadre member.  If 
the cadre members are random selected, it should not matter whether one bears the largest local 
surname.  However, the results in Table 2 indicate otherwise.  Column (1) indicates that men 
bearing the largest local surname are 2.7 percentage points more likely than their same-village 
fellows from smaller lineages to have ever been a village cadre member.  Considering that the 
average probability of having ever been a cadre member for men from smaller local lineages is 
18.7 percentage points, belonging to the largest local lineage can increase the probability by 14 
percent.  Columns (2) and (3) show that the impact of bearing the largest surname on becoming a 
cadre member is strong in the type 1 and 2 villages but diminishes to zero in the type 3 villages.   
        Since the size of lineages can be endogenous, an alternative interpretation of the results in 
Columns (1) – (3) of Table 2 can be that members of the largest lineages are smarter than those 
from small lineages.  To address this concern, I examine the link between women’s probability 
of being cadre members and their lineages’ size.  Column (4) of Table 2 shows that women who 
are the daughters of the largest local lineage and who live with their parents are no more likely 
than their smaller lineage counterparts to have ever been village cadre members.  In contrast, 
Column (5) of Table 2 indicates that wives of the members of the largest local lineage are 1.8 
percentage points more likely than wives of the members of smaller local lineages to be village 
cadre members.  Considering that the average probability of having ever been a village cadre 
                                                            
19 Wang et al. (2000) surveyed 60 villages from six provinces and found that 62 percent of all village cadre members 
are from the largest local lineages. 18 
 
member for wives from smaller local lineages is 8.2 percentage points, marrying the members of 
the largest local lineage can increase that probability of wives by 22%, which is a substantial 
impact.  Chinese custom prohibits lineage endogamy.  Wives must come from other lineages, 
and, after marriage, they are considered members of their husbands’ lineages (Baker, 1979).  
Unmarried single women are members of their fathers’ lineages.  Daughters are ranked lower 
than their mothers in the lineages because daughters will eventually marry into other lineages.  
The finding that married women, rather than daughters, benefit from the size of the lineage 
provides strong evidence to rule out the argument that large-lineage members perform better 
because they have better genes than small-lineage members.   
        However, marriage can be considered a process of sorting and matching.  Women who 
marry into the largest local lineage may be smarter or politically more ambitious than other 
women.  If this is the case, adding the husbands’ characteristics as control variables should 
significantly change the point estimate of the impact of marrying into the largest local lineage 
because the husbands’ characteristics should contain the information of sorting.  For example, a 
politically ambitious woman may prefer to marry a man who has been a village leader.  In 
Column (6) of Table 2, I add several control variables of husbands’ information, including years 
of schooling, a quadratic form of age, and an indicator of having ever been a village cadre 
member.  The result in Column (6) indicates that the point estimate of the impact of belonging to 
the largest local lineage remains the same as that in Column (5).  This suggests that marriage 
sorting  is  not  the  main  reasons  why  wives  in  the  largest  local  lineage  are  politically  more 
successful than wives in smaller local lineages.     
        To become a village cadre member, one needs support from either “up” or “down.”  “Up” 
refers  to  upper-level  administrators,  while  “Down”  refers  to  ordinary  villagers.    Empirical 19 
 
evidence is presented next to show that the largest local lineage can provide better support to 
their candidates from both “up” and “down.”  Since upper-level administrators are generally 
promoted from the ranks of previous village cadre members, I first test the association between a 
man’s likelihood of currently being a village cadre member with the number of the man’s lineage 
fellows who used to be village cadre members.  The empirical model is equation (2).  The 
outcome variable is the probability of currently being a cadre member for a person   in village   
in province  .     ,        is the number of people (other than  ), who are from the largest lineage 
at the village   in province   and who used to be cadre members.     ,        is the number of 
people (other than  ), who are from the other lineages at the village   in province   and who used 
to be cadre members.  The vector of village characteristics control variables includes geographic 
characteristics, land area, population size, total number of current cadre members and village 
election characteristics.     
        The results are presented in Table 3.  Column 1 shows that the likelihood of currently being 
a village cadre member for a man from the largest local lineage increases with the number of 
previous cadre members from his lineage.  But this likelihood is not affected by the number of 
previous cadre members from other lineages.  Column 2 of Table 3 shows that the likelihood of 
currently being a cadre member for a man from other lineages does not relate to the number of 
previous cadre members from the largest local lineage.  The results for wives have the same 
pattern as those for men.  The results in Table 3 suggest that lineages set boundaries to whom a 
person can receive support from.  Previous cadre members support only candidates from their 
lineages.  Since the largest local lineage has more previous cadre members than other local 
lineages, the largest local lineage can offer more support to their current candidates. 20 
 
        Next,  I  investigate  the  existence  of  support  from  ordinary  villagers.    I  don’t  have  the 
information from CHIPS about whom each villager voted for.  Instead, villagers were asked two 
questions about their interaction with local administrators: (a) Did you socialize with village 
cadre members in the last three months? (b) Did you seek help from village cadre members in 
the last three months?  I use the answers to these questions as outcome variables and use the 
model of equation (1) to test whether the answers depend on cadre members’ and villagers’ 
lineages.  The results in Panel A of Table 4 indicate that in villages in which more than 40 
percent of the cadre members are from the largest-surname lineage,
20 the villagers bearing the 
largest surname are more likely than villagers from other lineages to socialize with or seek help 
from the village cadre members.  On the contrary, in villages in which fewer than 40 percent of 
the  cadre  members  are  from  the  largest-surname  lineage,  the  villagers  bearing  the  largest 
surname are less likely villagers from other lineages to socialize with or seek help from the 
cadres than.  These results suggest that an ordinary villager is closer to the cadre members from 
his own lineage than to those from other lineages.  Consequently, an ordinary villager is more 
likely to benefit from the cadre members’ power if they are from the same lineage.  This may 
explain why villagers would vote for candidates who are from their own lineages. 
        The CHIPS asked villagers to evaluate whether the village cadre members make an effort to 
promote villagers’ wealth and whether they speak in the villagers’ interest.  The results in panel 
B of Table 5 show that the evaluations also depend on villagers’ and cadre members’ lineages.  
In the villages in which fewer than 40 percent of cadre members are from the largest-surname 
lineage, the evaluations from the villagers bearing the largest surname are significantly worse 
than those from villagers of other lineages.  However, in the villages in which more than 40 
percent of cadres are from the largest surname lineage, the evaluations of the villagers bearing 
                                                            
20 The percentage of cadre members who are from the largest lineage is calculated using surveyed population. 21 
 
the largest surname are slightly better, though not statistically significant, than those of villagers 
from other lineages.  These results can be interpreted as villagers’ prejudice, or they can indicate 
that the village cadre members truly treated villagers from their own clans better than other 
villagers.  Although I cannot determine which interpretation is correct, either would make an 
ordinary villager prefer to vote for a candidate from his own lineage.  
 
6.3  Economic Outcomes 
        Due  to  China’s  restrictive  migration  policy,  it  is  extremely  difficult  for  rural  people  to 
permanently migrate to cities.  Farmers are tied to their land and rely on farming as the main 
source of family income.  Each rural households has, on average, only 2,700m
2 (2/3 acre) of 
farm land, which is too small to generate an abundant family income.  The huge amount of 
surplus  labor  force  in  rural  China  is  eager  to  have  non-agricultural  jobs  to  increase  family 
earnings.           
6.3.1 Non-agricultural job opportunities 
        The CHIPS categorizes non-agricultural jobs into three types: (a) village or town
21 school 
teachers; (b) local workers who are employed in enterprises located in their own village or town; 
and (c) migrant workers who work in cities.  I use the village fixed-effects model of equation (1) 
to link an individual’s surname and his non-agricultural job opportunities.  The analysis sample 
includes  men  and  women  aged  between  16  and  60.    The  results  are  presented  in  Table  5.  
Column (1) shows that men bearing the largest surname are 3.7 percentage points more likely 
than men from other lineages in the same village to have a non-agricultural job.  In contrast, 
Columns (6)-(8) shows that the largest local lineage gives neither the daughters nor the wives 
better chances of working in non-agriculture sectors than their counterparts belonging to other 
                                                            
21 A town is a local administration unit in rural China, usually consisting of about ten villages. 22 
 
local lineages.  Column (7) does not include husband control variables,
22 while Column (8) does.  
Married women in rural area, regardless what lineages they marry into, traditionally don’t seek 
jobs.  The probability of having a non-agricultural job is only 16 percent for wives, as opposed to 
60 percent for men.  Columns (8) show that only education and family size affect wives’ non-
agriculture employment probabilities.  However, unmarried daughters are active in seeking jobs.  
The probability of having a non-agricultural job for unmarried daughters is 50 percent, which is 
substantial.  The contrast of men’s and daughters’ results again suggests that the impact of the 
largest  local  surname  should  not  be  attributed  to  biological  differences,  but  should  be  a 
networking  effect.    The  lineages  in  China’s  rural  villages  are  built  upon  patrilineal  kinship, 
which inevitably creates gender discrimination.  For example, if the networking of local lineages 
can work out a job position for someone in the lineage, boys are always ranked before girls to 
receive  this  benefit.    It  turns  out  that  among  the  non-agricultural  workers,  78  percent  of 
unmarried daughters and 70 percent of unmarried men work outside their own towns.  The 
difference suggests that the girls who demand jobs have to work harder than boys to explore 
outside opportunities since local kinship networking does not favor girls.  This is probably why 
local kinships have no impact on daughters’ non-agricultural job probabilities.  More discussion 
about the relationship between the place of work and the lineage networks is presented in Section 
6.3.2. 
        Columns (2) and (3) in Table 5 compare the impact of bearing the largest local surname on 
non-agricultural job probabilities across different types of villages.  The impact is strong in the 
type 1 and 2 villages but diminishes to zero in the type 3 villages.  Columns (4) and (5) compare 
the surname impact between men aged between 16 and 35 and men aged between 36 and 60.  
                                                            
22 These variables include the husband’s years of schooling, a quadratic form of age, a binary variable indicating 
whether the husband has a non-agricultural job. 23 
 
The results show that belonging to the largest local lineage is more beneficial to young men than 
to older men.  Column (3) indicates that belonging to the largest local lineage increases young 
men’s chances of having non-agricultural jobs by 5.3 percentage points.  Considering that the 
average probability of having a non-agricultural job for young men from smaller local lineages is 
56 percent, bearing the largest local surname increases young men’s chances by about 10 percent.  
On the contrary, being from the largest local lineage does not increase older men’s chances of 
having non-agricultural jobs.   
        The difference in the returns to years of schooling between young men and older men is 
worth noting.  For young men, one additional year of schooling increases their non-agricultural 
job opportunity by 0.5 percentage point, which means that the impact of bearing the largest local 
surname is equivalent to ten years of schooling.  However, when men are older than 35, the 
returns to one year of schooling becomes 1.8 percentage points, almost quadruple the effect for 
young men.  These results suggest that frictions may exist in the labor market of rural China.  It 
is hard for employers to observe young workers’ productivity since the workers are all from 
farming families and have little experience or training in non-agricultural sectors.  Consequently, 
job referrals can play an important role in the hiring process.  Young men from the largest local 
lineage have more people to ask for referrals than their counterparts from smaller local lineages, 
and, thus, are more successful in obtaining jobs.  As workers become more experienced, it is 
easier  for  employers  to  observe  their  productivity  and  job  referrals  become  less  important.  
Therefore, a good education, which tends to generate high productivity, can compensate for the 
disadvantage of belonging to a small lineage in the long run. 
        In order to further demonstrate that the impact of the largest local lineage works through 
lineage networks, I examine the association between young men’s probability of having non-24 
 
agricultural jobs and the work experience of the older men from the same lineage.  The model I 
use is equation (2).  Under this scenario, the outcome variable is the indicator of whether a young 
men   at village   in province   work outside of his own town.     ,        is the percentage of 
non-agricultural older workers among all the older men who come from the largest lineage in 
village   in province  .     ,        is the percentage of non-agricultural old workers among all 
the old men who come from other smaller lineages in village   in province  .  The result in 
Column (1) of Table 6 shows that the non-agricultural job probabilities of young men bearing the 
largest local surname positively correlates with the proportion of non-agricultural workers to 
older people from the same lineage, but has no correlation with other lineages.  Column 2 shows 
that  the  result  for  the  non-agricultural  job  opportunities  of  young  men  bearing  other  local 
surnames is the opposite: it has no correlation with the proportion of non-agricultural workers to 
older  people  from  the  largest  local  lineage  but positively  correlates  with  that  of  other  local 
lineages.  These results indicate that job referrals are more likely to happen within lineages than 
across lineages.          
6.3.2.  Local Workers or Migrant Workers 
        Villagers  can  work  in  non-agricultural  jobs  in  their  own  towns  or  in  cities.    Kinship 
networking can be useful in both types of job-seeking.  For example, networking with village 
cadre members, who usually have authority in hiring local public staff and village enterprise 
employees,
23 can increase one’s chances of obtaining a local job; networking with earlier migrant 
workers from the same lineage can increase one’s job opportunities in cities.  One may wonder 
which type of job opportunities the lineage networking can better promote for its members.  This 
                                                            
23 As in many developing countries, the political power of administrators in China often involves the right to allocate 
economic  resources.    Chinese  village  cadre  members  have  the  authority  in  appointing  managers  of  village 
enterprises, employ village public employees (e.g. school teachers), reallocating land, and determining large public 
investment (Qian, 2010).   25 
 
is an interesting question because the answer to this question can shed light on the connection 
between  political  power  and  economic  advantage  in  rural  China.    Since  members  from  the 
largest  local  lineage  are  more  likely  to  become  village  administrators,  the  local  economic 
resources that are handled through political power may disproportionately benefit the villagers 
who bear the largest local surname.  If the economic advantages of the local largest lineage truly 
arise from their political power, the advantages should only exist only locally because political 
power is constrained by the administrative border.  I, therefore, test whether the non-agricultural 
workers from the largest local lineage are more likely than those from smaller local lineages to 
obtain local jobs or urban jobs.  If the answer is local jobs, this suggests a strong connection 
between political power and economic advantage.   
        The model I use is equation (1).  The outcome variable is a binary indicator that is one if a 
non-agricultural  worker’s  main  job  is  outside  of  his  town.    I  use  the  sample  of  all  non-
agricultural male workers aged between 16 and 35 because earlier results show that they are the 
most likely to obtain their jobs through lineage networks.  The result presented in Column (1) of 
Table 6 indicates that young workers from the largest local lineage are six percentage points less 
likely  to  become  migrant  workers  than  their  counterparts  from  smaller  local  lineages.  
Considering that the average probability of being a migrant worker among young men from 
smaller local lineages is 60 percent, bearing the largest local surname reduces the probability by 
10 percent.  Columns (2) and (3) show that the impact of bearing the largest local surname on 
having a local non-agricultural job is stronger in type 1 and 2 than type 3 villages.  The impact is 
also  expected  to  be  stronger  in  the  villages  where  there  is  a  local  non-agricultural  sector.  
Columns (4) and (5) of Table 6 show that in villages that have village enterprises, members of 
the largest local lineage are more likely than other villagers to have local jobs; in villages that 26 
 
have no firms, there is no difference in the probability of having local jobs among workers across 
lineages.    
        In  order  to  further  demonstrate  that  political  power  and  economic  advantages  are 
interwoven in China’s villages, I examine the association between a young man’s probability of 
becoming a migrant worker and the number of the man’s lineage fellows who used to be village 
cadre members.  The model I use is equation (2).  The outcome variable is the indicator of 
whether a young men   in village   in province   work outside of his own town.      ,        is 
the number of people (other than  ) who are from the largest lineage in village   in province   
and who used to be village cadre members.     ,        is the number of people (other than  ), 
who are from the other lineages in village   in province   and who used to be village cadre 
members.  The results are presented in Table 7.  Column (1) shows that the more people from the 
largest local lineage used to be village cadres, the less likely young men from the same lineage 
are to be migrant workers.  In contrast, Column (4) shows that the probability of young men 
from smaller local lineages being a migrant worker is not associated with the number of previous 
cadre members either from the largest local lineage or from other local lineages.  These results 
suggest that village cadre members may use their power to help others obtain local jobs, but they 
render this help is only to young men of their lineages.  Consistent with the results in Table 7, 
Columns  (2)  and  (3)  in  Table  8  show  that  political  power  can  be  capitalized  to  economic 
advantages only in the villages where are village enterprises.     
        The link between political and economic outcomes suggests a reciprocity process among 
lineage members, which can work in the following way: From a villager’s point of view, he 
would like to vote his lineage fellows to be administrators because he expects that they will 
reward him or his family with job opportunities in the future; from a village administrator’s point 27 
 
of view, he would like to offer job opportunities to his lineage fellows rather than to members of 
other  lineage,  because  he  expects  that  the  satisfied  lineage  fellows  will  support  him  in 
maintaining his leadership position.  
6.3.3. Wages 
        Table 9 presents the wage difference between non-agricultural workers from the largest 
local  lineage  and  those  from  smaller  local  lineages.    The  model  is  equation  (1)  where  the 
outcome variable is the natural log of wage.  The sample consists of all men and women aged 
between 16 and 60.  Column (1) doesn’t show a statistically significant difference between male 
workers from the largest local lineage and those from smaller local lineages.  However, when the 
sample is restricted to type 1 and 2 villages, the result in Column (2) indicates that bearing the 
largest surname is associated with a 4.2-percent wage premium.  In type 3 villages, there is no 
difference in men’s wages across lineages.  Columns (4) and (5) show that the wage premium of 
the largest local lineage members exists only for men aged between 16 and 35, and not for older 
men.  The reason, perhaps, is still due to the frictions in the labor market of rural China: It is hard 
for employers to observe young workers’ productivity and the well-paid jobs initially are more 
likely to be obtained by young men who have better networking resources.  Columns (6)-(8) 
show that the wages of female members of the largest local lineage do not benefit from the size 
of their lineage as the male members do.   
        I also test whether the wage premium of bearing the largest local surname is greater for 
local workers or migrant workers.  I revise the model of equation (1) to the following form:   
ln  wage                                                  .  (3) 
   is an indicator of bearing the largest local surname.      is an indicator of migrant worker.  
Hence,    measures the impact of bearing the largest local surname on local workers’ wages.   28 
 
        measures the impact of bearing the largest local surname on migrant workers’ wages.  
The sample consists of young men aged between 16 and 35 because they are the people whose 
wages are affected by lineages.  The results are presented in Table 9.  Column (1) shows that 
bearing the largest surname increases wages by 12.3 percent for young local workers.  However, 
the largest local surname has no impact on wages at all for young migrant workers.  Then, I 
break  the  sample  down  into  the  villages  having  village  enterprises  and  those  having  no 
enterprises.  The villages with enterprises have similar results as in Column (1).  In contrast, in 
villages with no enterprises, bearing the largest surname has no impact on local young workers’ 
wages either.  These results again indicate that the economic advantages of belonging to the 
largest local lineage exist only locally.  The fact that economic advantages have a boundary 
suggests that it arises from the political power of the largest local lineage. 
         
7.  Conclusion 
 
Like many developing countries, rural China is a place where a fast-growing economy is 
embedded with traditional institutions.  The unique policies in China make the country a useful 
case to study the impact of lineage size on the members’ political and economic outcomes.  
Beginning in the 1950s, China’s restrictive migration policy froze the sizes of lineages, and the 
Commune  system  arbitrarily  grouped  multiple  lineages  into  single  administrative  village.   
Household income was highly equalized within villages until 1979, when China started political 
and  economic  reforms  and  the  lineage  identity  was  resurrected.    Exploring  these  policies,  I 
compare today’s political and economic outcomes between people from the largest local lineage 
and  their  same-village  fellows  from  smaller  local  lineages.    I  attribute  the  difference  in  the 29 
 
outcomes to lineage size because these two groups of people are the same in all aspects other 
than their lineages.    
The empirical study using data from the China Household Income Project Survey (2002) 
finds: (1) Both men and wives of the largest local lineage are more likely than their smaller local 
lineage counterparts to obtain local political leadership positions.  This finding suggests that the 
political advantage of large-lineage members arise from their larger networks, rather than from 
any biological differences from the smaller lineages.  (2) Young men (age 35 or younger) of the 
largest local lineage are more likely to have non-agricultural jobs and tend to have higher wages 
than their smaller local lineages’ counterparts.  However, older men’s lineages do not affect their 
employment probabilities and wages.  This finding reflects the fact that the labor market in rural 
China has frictions, particularly for inexperienced workers, and that informal job referrals play 
an important role in job-seeking.  (3) Young men from the largest local lineage are more likely 
than  their  counterparts  from  smaller  local  lineages  to  work  in  local  enterprises  instead  of 
migrating to cities to work.  In addition, the wage premium of belonging to the largest local 
lineage exists only among local workers, but not among migrant workers.  The fact that the 
largest local lineages’ economic advantages take place only locally suggests that the economic 
advantages may arise from their political power.  (4) The economic advantages of men from the 
largest local lineage can be offset in the long run if people from smaller local lineages have a 
good education.  This result suggests that education can be the key to promoting social mobility 
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Table 1. Evidence of Mutual Help in Villages 
   coefficient of "the largest surname" indicator 
  all 




Dependent Variable    (1)    (2)    (3) 
help farming  0.055** 0.068** -0.002 
[0.026] [0.030] [0.053] 
help money  0.052** 0.067** 0.003 
[0.026] [0.030] [0.052] 
help caring the sick, senior 
or young 
0.024** 0.035** 0.006 
[0.012] [0.017] [0.027] 
help wedding and funeral 
ceremonies 
0.026** 0.035** -0.008 
[0.013] [0.015] [0.029] 
ln(loss of annual income in 
case of natural disasters) 
-0.082** -0.094** -0.017 
[0.035] [0.037] [0.088] 
Notes: 
All regressions include village fix-effects. The other control variables include 
years of schooling, a quadratic form of age, an indicator of marital status and 
the family size. Standard errors are clustered by village.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2. The Probability of Having Ever Been a Cadre Member 
 
Dependent Variable: has ever been a cadre member = 1          
Men  Daughters 






villages  all  all 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
largest surname  0.026**  0.029** 0.015 -0.006 0.018**  0.017*
[0.012]  [0.014] [0.025] [0.027] [0.009]  [0.009]
years of schooling  0.034***  0.032*** 0.035*** 0.003 0.008***  0.009***
[0.002]  [0.002] [0.003] [0.005] [0.001]  [0.001]
age  0.013***  0.016*** 0.005 0.004 0.003  0.006
[0.004]  [0.005] [0.008] [0.016] [0.004]  [0.007]
age
2  0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000
[0.000]  [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000]
family size  0.051***  0.057*** 0.04 0.005 -0.004  -0.004
[0.018]  [0.021] [0.032] [0.026] [0.003]  [0.003]
married  -0.004  -0.007 0.001 -0.001 -  - 
[0.004]  [0.004] [0.006] [0.008] -  - 
husband controls 
c  -  -  -  -  N  Y 
# of observations  9841  6852 2973 1,364 7484  7484
# of villages  958  640 316 665 956  956
R
2  0.081  0.084 0.074 0.017 0.006  0.069
Notes: 
a.“Daughters”  are  the  women  who  are  daughters  of  the  household  heads.  70  percent  of  the 
daughters are unmarried girls. The largest surname indicator refers to their maiden names. “Wives” 
are the women who are spouses of the household heads. The largest surname indicator refers to 
their husbands’ surnames.  
b. The largest local surname is more dominant in type 1 and 2 villages than in type 3 villages. See 
text for details. 
c. The “husband controls” include the husband’s years of schooling, a quadratic form of husband’s 
age, and an indicator of whether the husband has ever been a cadre member. 
All regressions include village fix-effects. Standard errors are clustered by village.    
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 35 
 
Table 3. Lineage Networking and the Probability of Currently Being a Cadre Member 
 
Dependent Variable: currently being a cadre member = 1 
   Men  Wives  








   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
# of previous cadre members 
bearing the largest surname  
0.012*** 0.006 0.004**  0.003
[0.003] [0.004] [0.002]  [0.002]
# of previous cadre members 
bearing other surnames  
0.003 0.005* 0.003  0.000
[0.004] [0.003] [0.003]  [0.002]
years of schooling  0.015*** 0.008*** 0.002  0.003**
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002]  [0.001]
age  0.015 -0.012 -0.002  0.017
[0.020] [0.019] [0.011]  [0.011]
age
2  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  [0.000]
married  0.016 0.047 -0.136**  0.023
[0.040] [0.045] [0.064]  [0.043]
family size   0.002 -0.013** 0.001  -0.005
[0.006] [0.006] [0.004]  [0.003]
village characteristics 
a  YY Y   Y
# of observations  1,441 1,496 1,553  1,566
# of provinces  22 22 22  22
R
2  0.034 0.027 0.052  0.043
Notes: 
a.  The  village  characteristics  include  the  geographic  characteristics,  an  indicator  of 
whether  the  village  belongs  to  a  National  Poverty  County,  the  natural  log  of  village 
population and land area, the indicators of the types of village elections. 
All regressions use province fix-effects model. Robust stand errors are in brackets.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4. The Relations between Villagers and Cadre Members 
 
  
≥40% of village 
cadre members are 
of largest surname <40% 
≥40% of village 
cadre members are 
of largest surname  <40% 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Panel A. Socialization  seek help from cadre members socialize with cadre members
largest surname  0.995**  -0.588  0.438*  -0.648** 
[0.441]  [0.783]  [0.232]  [0.271] 
Panel B. Evaluations  Does the cadre promote wealth? Does the cadre speak for people?
largest surname  0.178  -0.760**  0.218  -0.699* 
   [0.228]  [0.298]  [0.254]  [0.413] 
Notes: 
All regressions control for years of schooling, a quadratic form of age, marital status indicator, and 
family size.  All regressions use village fix-effects model. Standard errors are clustered by village.   




Table 5. The Probability of having a non-agricultural job 
 
Dependent Variable: has a non-agricultural job = 1 
Men  Daughters 






villages  age 16-35  age 36-60  all  all 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
largest surname  0.037*** 0.045*** 0.008 0.053*** 0.023 -0.007 -0.002 -0.003
[0.012] [0.014] [0.025] [0.018] [0.015] [0.025] [0.011] [0.011]
years of schooling  0.015*** 0.013*** 0.021*** 0.005* 0.018*** -0.013*** 0.013*** 0.012***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.003] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002] [0.002]
age  0.046*** 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.100*** -0.025** 0.150*** 0.020*** 0.002
[0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.012] [0.011] [0.010] [0.004] [0.007]
age
2  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** -0.000*** 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
married  0.070*** 0.062*** 0.096*** 0.012 0.120*** -0.279*** -0.02 -0.021
[0.015] [0.018] [0.026] [0.019] [0.030] [0.032] [0.048] [0.048]
family size  -0.036*** -0.043*** -0.021*** -0.026*** -0.041*** 0.013 -0.017*** -0.017***
[0.004] [0.004] [0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.008] [0.003] [0.003]
husband controls 
c  -  -  -  -  -  -  N  Y 
observations  12,708 8,901 3,787 5,643 7,065 3,474 7,858 7,832
# of villages  958 640 316 950 958 905 959 958
R
2  0.071 0.07 0.081 0.082 0.084 0.111 0.046 0.049
Notes: 
a.“Daughters” are the women who are daughters of the household heads. 70 percent of the daughters are unmarried girls. The 
largest surname indicator refers to their maiden names. “Wives” are the women who are spouses of the household heads. The 
largest surname indicator refers to their husbands’ surnames.  
  b. The largest local surname is more dominant in type 1and 2 villages than in type 3 villages. See text for details. 
c. The “husband controls” include the husband’s years of schooling, a quadratic form of husband’s age, and an indicator of 
whether the husband has a non-agricultural job. 
All regressions use village fix-effects model. Stand errors are clustered by village.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.138 
 
 
Table 6. Lineage Networking and The Probability of Having a Non-agricultural Job 
 
Dependent Variable: has a non-agricultural job = 1 
Men aged 16-35 




   (1)  (2) 
% of non-agricultural workers in 
old people of the largest surname 
0.088** 0.067 
[0.042] [0.044] 
% of non-agricultural old workers 
in old people of other surnames 
0.036 0.146*** 
[0.034] [0.050] 
years of schooling  0.004 0.01 
[0.006] [0.007] 
age  0.109*** 0.197*** 
[0.022] [0.045] 
age
2  -0.002*** -0.004*** 
[0.000] [0.001] 
married  -0.004 0.012 
[0.035] [0.042] 
family size   -0.019* -0.025* 
[0.010] [0.013] 
village characteristics 
a  YY  
# of observations  1,502 1,128 
# of Provinces  22 22 
R
2  0.091 0.083 
Notes: 
a. The village characteristics include the geographic characteristics, an 
indicator of whether the village belongs to a National Poverty County, 
the natural log of village population and land area. 
All regressions use province fix-effects model. Standard errors are 
clustered by village.    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 7. The Place of Work 
 










has no village 
enterprises 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
largest surname  -0.060** -0.070** -0.021 -0.076*  -0.002
[0.030] [0.032] [0.082] [0.044]  [0.043]
years of schooling  0.002 0.000 0.006 0.006  -0.001
[0.005] [0.006] [0.013] [0.007]  [0.007]
age  0.065 0.034 0.173* 0.106**  0.015
[0.043] [0.048] [0.101] [0.043]  [0.045]
age
2  -0.001 -0.001 -0.004* -0.002**  0.000
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001]  [0.001]
married  -0.096*** -0.123*** 0.007 -0.090***  -0.103***
[0.027] [0.030] [0.057] [0.034]  [0.037]
family size  0.018** 0.018* 0.011 0.020*  0.027**
[0.009] [0.010] [0.020] [0.011]  [0.011]
# of observations  1,852 1,423 426 1,061  791
# of villages  675 483 191 391  284
R
2  0.019 0.024 0.017 0.032  0.022
Notes: 
a. The largest local surname is more dominant in type 1 and 2 villages than in type 3 
villages. See text for details. 
All regressions use village fix-effects model. Standard errors are clustered by village.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8.  Lineage Networking and the Place of Work 
 
Dependent Variable: migrant worker = 1 
   Men of the largest surname aged 16-35  Men of other 
surnames 
aged 16-35  all 
has village 
enterprises 
has no village 
enterprises 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
# of previous cadre members 
bearing the largest surname  
-0.014** -0.024*** -0.002  0.008
[0.006] [0.009] [0.009]  [0.011]
# of previous cadre members 
bearing other surnames  
-0.011 -0.013 -0.013  -0.003
[0.008] [0.017] [0.009]  [0.006]
years of schooling  0.000 0.007 -0.009  -0.019**
[0.008] [0.011] [0.011]  [0.009]
age  0.07 0.084 0.006  0.097
[0.053] [0.068] [0.082]  [0.064]
age
2  -0.001 -0.001 0.000  -0.002*
[0.001] [0.001] [0.002]  [0.001]
married  -0.190*** -0.252*** -0.152**  -0.064
[0.044] [0.058] [0.068]  [0.049]
family size  0.062*** 0.045** 0.045**  -0.005
[0.013] [0.019] [0.020]  [0.015]
village characteristics 
a  YY Y   Y
# of observations  673 389 271  592
# of Provinces  21 21 20  22
R
2  0.131 0.214 0.196  0.116
Notes: 
a. The village characteristics include the geographic characteristics, an indicator of whether 
the village belongs to a National Poverty County, the natural log of village population and 
land area, the indicators of the types of village elections. 
All regressions use province fix-effects model. Robust standard errors are in brackets.   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9. Wages 
 
Dependent Variable: ln(wage) 







villages  age 16-35  age 36-60  all  all 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
largest surname  0.030 0.042* -0.016 0.072** 0.016 0.065 -0.005 -0.012
[0.021] [0.022] [0.049] [0.034] [0.028] [0.058] [0.056] [0.057]
years of schooling  0.023*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.026*** 0.022** 0.043*** 0.047***
[0.003] [0.004] [0.007] [0.006] [0.005] [0.010] [0.009] [0.010]
age  0.040*** 0.041*** 0.036*** 0.044* -0.005 0.123*** 0.042 -0.035
[0.006] [0.006] [0.012] [0.025] [0.022] [0.036] [0.027] [0.048]
age
2  -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.001 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 0.000
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.001]
married  0.092*** 0.071** 0.149** 0.055 0.079 -0.015 0.109 0.13
[0.028] [0.031] [0.060] [0.035] [0.068] [0.082] [0.306] [0.310]
family size  -0.01 -0.01 -0.009 -0.015 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.008
[0.006] [0.007] [0.013] [0.010] [0.009] [0.019] [0.021] [0.022]
husband controls 
c  -  -  -  -  -  -  N  Y 
# of observations  6,184 4,466 1,710 2,538 3,646 871 1,079 1,074
# of villages  902 620 280 795 855 455 429 427
R
2  0.044 0.044 0.046 0.048 0.019 0.046 0.041 0.052
Notes: 
a.“Daughters” are the women who are daughters of the household heads. 70 percent of the daughters are unmarried girls. The 
largest surname indicator refers to their maiden names. “Wives” are the women who are spouses of the household heads. The 
largest surname indicator refers to their husbands’ surnames.  
b. The largest local surname is more dominant in type 1 and 2 villages than in type 3 villages. See text for details. 
c. The “husband controls” include the husband’s years of schooling, a quadratic form of husband’s age, and an indicator of 
whether the husband has a non-agricultural job. 
All regressions use village fix-effects model. Standard errors are clustered by village.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.142 
 
Table 10. The Wages of Local Workers Vs. Migrant Workers 
 
Dependent Variable: ln(wage)       




has no village 
enterprises 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
largest surname  0.123** 0.144** 0.042 
[0.053] [0.057] [0.083] 
largest surname*migrant worker  -0.125** -0.136* -0.079 
[0.055] [0.071] [0.091] 
migrant worker  -0.019 -0.011 -0.036 
[0.041] [0.053] [0.068] 
years of schooling  0.022*** 0.020** 0.025*** 
[0.006] [0.009] [0.010] 
age  0.045* 0.039 0.047 
[0.026] [0.035] [0.040] 
age
2  -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
[0.000] [0.001] [0.001] 
married  0.048 0.029 0.071 
[0.036] [0.047] [0.057] 
family size  -0.009 -0.003 -0.019 
[0.011] [0.014] [0.017] 
# of observations  2323 1306 978 
# of villages  759 407 336 
R
2  0.054 0.048 0.064 
Notes: 
All regressions use province fix-effects model. Standard errors are clustered by 
village.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure A1. Types of Villages by Lineage Compositions 
 
















































Table A1. Summary of Village Characteristics by Village Types 
 
   Type 1 Type 2  Type 3
general 
# of villages  287 354  319
% of the largest surname in village population  71% 37%  15%
village population  1652 1859  1904
farm land area (acres)  453 624  693
geographic 
mountainous area  21% 26%  16%
suburb of large cities  7% 6%  11%
distance to the closest primary school (km)  0.56 0.47  0.76
distance to the closest junior high school (km)  1.89 2.21  2.66
economic 
income per capita  382.57 332.57  347.86
annual growth rate of income per cap since 1990  6.6% 5.6%  4.8%
has village enterprises  54% 53%  48%
% of agricultural labor in total labor force  63% 70%  71%
% of migrant workers in total labor force  23% 23%  21%
political 
the village council members are determined by 
direct election  94% 94%  93%
The candidates of the village council members 
are nominated by villagers  84% 88%  93%
the number of the congress of the villager 
convenes  3.9 3.6  4.0
Source: China Household Income Survey (2002) 
Note: In type 1 villages, the largest surname households account for over 50 percent of total 
households.  In type 2 villages, the largest surname households account for less than 50 percent 
of  total  households,  but  the  top  five  surnames  account  for  more  than  50  percent  of  total 
households.  In the type 3 villages, the top five surnames account for less than 50 percent of 
total households.  45 
 
Table A2. Summary of Personal Characteristics by Surnames 
   local largest surname  other surnames  difference   s.e. 
(1)  (2)  (1)-(2)    
Men             
years of schooling   7.885 7.646 0.239***  0.043
age  37.718 37.605 0.112  0.221
married  0.751 0.752 -0.002  0.008
family size  4.531 4.379 0.152  0.024
have ever been a cadre member  0.222 0.187 0.036***  0.007
currently being a cadre member  0.145 0.129 0.016**  0.006
has a non-agricultural job  0.631 0.575 0.056***  0.009
migrant worker  0.424 0.397 0.026**  0.012
wage  3.130 3.140 -0.009  0.18
observation  5368 7471     
Wives 
years of schooling   5.76 5.809 -0.049  0.065
age  43.349 42.781 0.568***  0.193
family size  4.293 4.175 0.118***  0.028
have ever been a cadre member  0.091 0.082 0.01  0.006
currently being a cadre member  0.063 0.061 0.003  0.005
has a non-agricultural job  0.162 0.154 0.008  0.008
wage  2.544 2.813 -0.27  0.282
observation  3377 4698     
Daughters 
years of schooling   8.607 8.526 0.081  0.132
age  24.698 24.258 0.440*  0.227
married  0.296 0.313 -0.016  0.025
family size  5.003 4.867 0.136*  0.074
have ever been a cadre member  0.085 0.063 0.022  0.014
currently being a cadre member  0.065 0.051 0.014  0.013
has a non-agricultural job  0.537 0.471 0.066  0.027
migrant worker  0.387 0.355 0.031  0.021
wage  2.262 1.960 0.302**  0.154
observation  587 790     
Source: China Household Income Survey (2002) 
Note: The men sample consists of men aged between 16 and 60 and currently not in school.  The 
wives sample consists of women who are the spouses of the household heads, whose ages are 
between 21 and 60, and who are currently not in school.  The daughters sample consists of women 
who are daughters of the household heads, whose ages are between 21 and 60, and who currently 
are not at school. 
 